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Abstract
The Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) established a laboratory network within the GHSI 
community to develop collective surge capacity for radionuclide bioassay in response to a 
radiological or nuclear emergency as a means of enhancing response capability, health outcomes 
and community resilience. GHSI partners conducted an exercise in collaboration with the WHO 
REMPAN (Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness and Assistance Network) and the IAEA 
RANET (Response and Assistance Network), to test the participating laboratories (18) for their 
capabilities in in vitro assay of biological samples, using a urine sample spiked with multiple high-
risk radionuclides (90Sr, 106Ru, 137Cs, and 239Pu). Laboratories were required to submit their 
reports within 72 hours following receipt of the sample, using a pre-formatted template, on the 
procedures, methods and techniques used to identify and quantify the radionuclides in the sample, 
as well as the bioassay results with a 95% confidence interval. All of the participating laboratories 
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identified and measured all or some of the radionuclides in the sample. However, gaps were 
identified in both the procedures used to assay multiple radionuclides in one sample, as well as in 
the methods or techniques used to assay specific radionuclides in urine. Two third of the 
participating laboratories had difficulties in determining all the radionuclides in the sample. 
Results from this exercise indicate that challenges remain with respect to ensuring that results are 
delivered in a timely, consistent and reliable manner to support medical interventions. Laboratories 
within the networks are encouraged to work together to develop and maintain collective 
capabilities and capacity for emergency bioassay, which is an important component of radiation 
emergency response.
Keywords
nuclear emergency; radiological emergency; radioactive contamination; radionuclide bioassay; 
internal dosimetry
Introduction
Following a radiological or nuclear emergency, workers, first responders and the public may 
be internally contaminated with the radionuclide(s) involved. Rapid assessment of internal 
contamination, through in vitro or in vivo bioassay, provides timely information for medical 
intervention, if necessary, and provides assurance to those who do not require further 
examination. Accordingly, emergency radionuclide bioassay capacity is essential to support 
emergency response. In a large-scale emergency, it is possible that laboratories from other 
regions or other countries may be called upon for assistance.
The Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) is an informal network of countries formed in 
2001 to ensure health-sector exchange and coordination of practices in confronting risks to 
global health posed by chemical, biological and radio-nuclear threats, as well as by 
pandemic influenza(1). The member countries/organizations of the GHSI are Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, the United States and the 
European Commission. The World Health Organization (WHO) is a technical advisor to the 
GHSI. As part of the GHSI partnership, an annual meeting of Health Ministers is held to 
foster dialogue on topical policy issues and promote collaboration. Other initiatives 
involving senior health officials as well as policy, technical and scientific personnel take 
place on a regular basis, focused on risk management; communications; chemical events; 
radio-nuclear threats; pandemic influenza; and global laboratory cooperation.
The GHSI Radio-Nuclear Threats Working Group (RNWG) was created to facilitate sharing 
and collaboration on policies and capability development to enhance public health 
preparedness and response to radiological and nuclear threats. As a result of discussions and 
consultations, the RNWG established an informal laboratory network to improve collective 
capabilities and capacity for radionuclide bioassay within the GHSI community. Within this 
network, laboratories can share their expertise through training activities, exercise their 
preparedness through intercomparisons, develop new capabilities through collaborative 
R&D, and assist in bioassay analysis when additional laboratories are required following an 
emergency.
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In 2013, the network laboratories were surveyed on their current capabilities in emergency 
radionuclide bioassay and the technological and operational gaps they had identified in this 
area. Based on the survey results, the RNWG decided to conduct two exercises. The first 
exercise was organized in 2014 to test the participating laboratories for their response 
capabilities in assaying a single radionuclide (241Am) in a urine sample, performing internal 
dose assessment, and providing advice on medical intervention when necessary. Results for 
the first exercise have been published (2).
The second exercise, organized in early 2016 and reported in this paper, is to test the 
participating laboratories (18) for their response capabilities in assaying multiple 
radionuclides in a single urine sample, focusing on the procedures and methods/techniques 
used and the results obtained by the participating laboratories. This exercise was in 
collaboration with the WHO REMPAN (Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness and 
Assistance Network, World Health Organization) (3) and the IAEA RANET (Response and 
Assistance Network, International Atomic Energy Agency) (4). Some laboratories from the 
REMPAN collaborating centers and liaison institutions and the ones that had registered their 
bioassay capabilities in the RANET database participated in this exercise, together with 
laboratories in the GHSI network.
Methods and Materials
Exercise Design
A scenario (unspecified) based on a severe nuclear power plant accident was adopted, with a 
simplified selection of radionuclides for the purpose of this exercise. The four selected 
radionuclides (90Sr, 106Ru, 137Cs and 239Pu) represent significant dose contributors 
potentially released from a nuclear power plant accident; they also serve as good candidates 
to test the participating laboratories on their bioassay capabilities for mixed α, β, and γ 
emitters. The activity ratios of the four radionuclides (106Ru: 137Cs: 90Sr: 239Pu = 1: 1.16: 
0.137: 1.78 × 10−4) are referenced to the source term of the Chernobyl accident (5) although 
in another accident these may be very different as a result of many factors, such as the 
design of the reactor and the technologies used to reduce the source term. The ratios of these 
radionuclides in the intake by an individual would also be very different as the dispersion 
and deposition of these radionuclides may be controlled by different parameters. 
Nevertheless, these ratios were used as a reference when selecting the intake activities of the 
radionuclides in this project.
NCRP 161 (6) introduces a new operational quantity, the Clinical Decision Guide (CDG), for 
physicians to consider the need for medical treatment of internal contamination. The CDG 
value is the intake of a radionuclide that satisfies both the stochastic health effect criterion (a 
50 y committed effective dose (CED) of 0.25 Sv for adults) and the deterministic health 
effect criterion (the 30 d RBE-weighted absorbed dose values of 0.25 Gy-Eq to bone marrow 
or 1 Gy-Eq to the lungs, for adults). For the four radionuclides considered in this project, the 
stochastic health effect criterion applies. NCRP 161 further recommends that for inhalation 
exposure, a particle size of 5 μm AMAD (activity median aerodynamic diameter) may be 
used in the derivation of the CDGs as it is judged to be a reasonable default particle size 
because intakes of clinical significance are more likely to occur near the point of release 
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where the sizes of airborne particles are usually the largest and the concentrations of 
airborne radionuclides are usually highest (6).
Among the four radionuclides, 106Ru would give the highest CED if the release scenario was 
the same as the Chernobyl accident. For a CED of 0.25 Sv, using the default inhalation 
solubility (type M) for 106Ru according to ICRP 71(7) and calculating the intake and 
bioassay quantities using IMBA Plus® (version 4.0.36, provided by ACJ & Associates, Inc., 
129 Patton Street, Richland, WA, USA), the calculated intake is 1.50 × 107 Bq and the 
calculated urine excretion on Day 7 is 1.46 × 104 Bq (or 2.28 × 103 Bq in 250 mL, using 
default daily urine excretion of 1.6 L recommended by ICRP). Based on the intake activity 
of 106Ru and the source term ratios discussed above, the calculated intakes for 137Cs (type 
F), 90Sr (Type M) and 239Pu (Type M) are 1.74 × 107 Bq, 2.06 × 106 Bq and 2.67 × 103 Bq, 
respectively. Urine excretions on Day 7 for these three radionuclides would be 6.64 × 104 Bq 
(or 1.04 × 104 Bq in 250 mL), 2.89 × 103 Bq (or 4.52 × 102 Bq in 250 mL), and 65.1 mBq 
(or 10.2 mBq in 250 mL), respectively. Table 1 lists the activities (Bq) spiked in a 250 mL 
urine sample provided to each participating laboratory and their concentrations (Bq/L). The 
spiked activities are corresponding to about 1% of the above calculated activities 
for 137Cs, 90Sr and 106Ru, and about 100% of that for 239Pu in a 250 mL urine sample 
collected on Day 7 following exposure, taking into consideration both the objectives of this 
exercise and the technical challenges in assaying each radionuclide.
Sample Preparation and Distribution
Blank urine was collected from healthy unexposed individuals, pooled, preserved with 1% 
HCl, and spiked with the four radionuclides: 90Sr (SRM 4919I, NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, 
USA), 106Ru and 239Pu (Lot 1847-55-1 and Lot 1443-58-2, respectively, Eckert Ziegler 
Isotope Products, Valencia, CA, USA), and 137Cs (Lot S0/35/57, Amersham Laboratories, 
Buckinghamshire, UK), following the standard procedure of the National Calibration 
Reference Center for Bioassay and In Vivo Monitoring, Health Canada, which is certified to 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9001:2008 standard (8). The spiked 
urine sample was then divided into 250 mL aliquots; one was sent to each participating 
laboratory by a commercial courier without freezing. Laboratories were required to report 
results within 72 hours following receipt of the sample. The 250 mL sample size was chosen 
to enable all of the laboratories to use their existing analytical methods, however, in an 
emergency situation, a laboratory would only expect to receive about 30 to 100 mL of urine 
on average based on past public health emergency responses (CDC personal 
communication).
Results and Discussions
Response to Reporting Schedule
A message was sent to the participating laboratories immediately after the samples were 
picked up by the courier. The majority of the laboratories received the samples within three 
days. A small number of them experienced a short delay mainly due to customs clearance. 
One laboratory ultimately withdrew from this exercise after discovering that customs 
clearance would take up to a month.
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Overall, 15 of the participating laboratories submitted their reports within 72 hours of 
receiving the sample (the required reporting schedule). Three laboratories started late as a 
result of a scheduling conflict with other work commitments or instrument breakdown, but 
submitted their reports within 72 hours. Considering the fact that the radionuclides in the 
sample are unknown to the participating laboratories, identification and quantification of 
different radionuclides require different methods and techniques, and the measurement of 
radionuclides at low levels takes time, reporting the results within the required reporting 
schedule of 72 hours is acceptable. However, it is worthwhile to note that during a real 
emergency, when faced with hundreds to thousands of samples, laboratories are expected to 
have very short turnaround time for sample analysis and reporting so to support decisions on 
medical intervention.
Reported Procedures for Screening the Sample
The laboratories did not know what radionuclides were spiked in the sample, or the activity 
levels. The participating laboratories were only notified that the urine sample simulates a 
collection from an individual who was contaminated during a severe nuclear power plant 
accident and that the selection of radionuclides was simplified for the purpose of this 
exercise.
Screening the sample using available instrumentation and procedures before assaying 
specific radionuclides can help identify certain radionuclides in the sample, for example, if 
beta/alpha emitters are present, or even provide qualitative evaluation on the activity levels 
of certain radionuclides, depending on the instrumentation and procedures used. Eleven out 
of the 18 participating laboratories screened the samples before performing assays for 
specific radionuclides. All of them screened using gamma spectrometry using the whole or a 
fraction of the sample received (L02, L03, L05, L06, L08, L09, L10, L13, L17, L18, and 
L19), while four of them (L02, L03, L09, and L10) also screened for gross beta/alpha using 
liquid scintillation counting. Results from such screening can help in selecting the methods/
techniques for assaying specific radionuclides, determining the size of sub-samples for 
different analyses, and allocating the time for sample preparation and measurements.
Reported Methods and Techniques for Assaying Individual Radionuclides
Splitting the sample received (250 mL) into sub-samples for the assays of different 
radionuclides using different methods/techniques is the common approach of many 
participating laboratories. This allows the assays for different radionuclides to be carried out 
at the same time and ultimately helps reduce the sample turnaround time.
High resolution gamma spectrometry was used for assaying both 137Cs (photon peak of 662 
keV for 137mBa) and 106Ru (photon peak of 622 keV for 106Rh) in the sample by 15 out of 
the 18 participating laboratories, with the volume of sub-sample varying from 10 mL to 250 
mL and the counting time varying from 15 min to 64 hours. All 15 laboratories identified 
and quantified 137Cs in the sample, but three of them missed 106Ru. This was mainly caused 
by the small volume of sub-sample and/or the short counting time used, as the photon peak 
area of 106Rh (representing 106Ru) is much smaller than that of 137Cs. A larger volume 
and/or longer counting time would improve the identification and quantification of 106Ru in 
Li et al. Page 5
Radiat Prot Dosimetry. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 December 11.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
the sample. However, during a real emergency, the available volume of a sample may be 
small and the counting time may have to be short.
Assaying 90Sr in the sample might be the most challenging task of this exercise. Only half of 
the 18 participating laboratories reported results for 90Sr. Unless chemical separation is 
applied, direct assay using typical liquid scintillation counting would not tell the presence 
of 90Sr (or its daughter 90Y) in the sample as there are two other beta emitting radionuclides 
in the sample, 106Ru and 137Cs, whose activities are higher by a factor 4 and 20, 
respectively. Comparing the measurements for gamma activities and gross beta activities in 
the sample, especially when the counting time is short, would not help in identifying a pure 
beta emitter, in this case 90Sr, as its activity is very low compared to that of other 
radionuclides. This was demonstrated by one laboratory. In this exercise, the responding 
laboratories separated 90Sr or its daughter 90Y from an aliquot of the urine sample following 
chemical treatments involving precipitation, digestion and separation using ion exchange, 
ion chromatography or extraction chromatography. 90Sr was quantified either by measuring 
itself or the ingrowth of its daughter, 90Y, using liquid scintillation counting, gas flow 
proportional counting, or Čherenkov counting.
Thirteen participating laboratories reported results for 239Pu with one of them reporting a 
level of less than the detection limit of the method used (70 mBq/L). The measurement 
of 239Pu in the sample was made either using inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry 
(ICP-MS, L02) or using alpha spectrometry (the other 12 laboratories) following extensive 
sample preparation, which involves adding tracers to the sub-sample, precipitating the 
analyte using calcium (and magnesium for one laboratory) phosphate, decomposing the 
precipitate using HNO3 (and H2O2 in some laboratories) with or without a microwave 
system, separating the analyte using anion exchange chromatography and/or solid phase 
extraction chromatography, preparing the source using lanthanide fluoride micro-
precipitation or electrodeposition on stainless steel discs, and counting the source using 
alpha spectrometry. The volume of the sub-sample and the counting time used for the 
measurement of 239Pu in the sample varied significantly among the laboratories, which 
resulted in a wide range of detection limits and measurement accuracy.
As described above, the measurements of 239Pu and 90Sr in the sample involved chemical 
separation steps. Tracers, such as 242Pu for 239Pu, and carrier, such as stable strontium 
for 90Sr, were used by many of the participating laboratories. The use of tracer or carrier 
allows the monitoring of chemical recoveries and correction of the final assay results.
Five laboratories applied procedures for sequential separation of the radionuclides in the 
sample, using either an ion exchange column (L05, L08, L09) or a stack of solid phase 
extraction columns (L06, L12). A procedure with sequential separation capability allows the 
separation of multiple radionuclides in one sample, avoids splitting the sample for the assays 
of different radionuclides, saves time in sample preparation, and improves the quality of 
assay results.
ICP-MS is a rapidly growing technique for the measurement of trace elements. It has been 
applied to the measurements of radionuclides in human and environmental samples thanks to 
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its super sensitivity. As demonstrated by one laboratory (L02), 239Pu in the urine sample can 
be quantified using only 1 mL of the sample, by ICP-MS in conjunction with solid phase 
extraction and an efficient sample introduction system. However, as the concentrations of the 
radionuclides involved in this exercise are very low, without appropriate sample preparation 
(for chemical purification) and specialized sample introduction to ICP-MS for enhanced ion 
transport efficiency, it would not be possible to measure them using ICP-MS due to 
insufficient limits of detection (L01, L08, L16).
It is worthwhile to note that many laboratories reported their efforts in identifying and 
quantifying many other radionuclides, namely 3H, 14C, 89Sr, 238U, 238Pu, 241Am, 242Cm, 
and 244Cm, which are not involved in this exercise but are very relevant to the scenario 
communicated to the laboratories. In a realistic severe nuclear power plant accident, some of 
them might be present in the bioassay samples collected from the affected individuals.
Reported Bioassay Results
Table 2 and Figures 1–4 present the bioassay results reported by the participating 
laboratories with uncertainties at 95% confidence interval (CI). The reported concentrations 
of the radionuclides in the sample are quite close to the spiked levels (Table 1) in this 
exercise, with a small number of exceptions (e.g. 137Cs reported by L16 and 90Sr reported 
by L09). The reported uncertainties for all of the four radionuclides vary significantly. This 
is caused mainly by the differences in the volume of the sub-sample, assay method or 
technique, and the counting time used by the participating laboratories. The methods used to 
estimate assay uncertainties by the laboratories vary, but most of them follow the established 
methods for uncertainty estimation and propagation, published as national or international 
standards. It is worthwhile to note that there are no published acceptance criteria for 
emergency bioassay. International organizations, such as the ISO (International Organization 
for Standardization), may consider the feasibility of developing such criteria.
As discussed above, 90Sr, 106Ru, 137Cs and 239Pu were selected for this exercise as they 
would be significant dose contributors potentially released from a severe nuclear power plant 
accident and are good candidates to test the participating laboratories on their bioassay 
capabilities for mixed α, β, and γ emitters in one sample. In the stock solutions used to 
spike the urine sample, 90Sr and 90Y, and 106Ru and 106Rh, have reached equilibrium, 
respectively. Three laboratories (L03, L08, and L13) reported results for 106Ru 
as 106Ru/106Rh. Four laboratories (L06, L08, L12, and L13) reported 239Pu as 239,240Pu 
because the energy resolution for alpha spectrometry cannot differentiate the signal 
from 239Pu and that from 240Pu. One laboratory (L13) reported 90Sr as 89,90Sr as the 
chemistry used to extract 90Sr from the urine sample and the measurement using gas flow 
proportional counting could not differentiate the signal of 90Sr from that of 89Sr, another 
important radionuclide from the nuclear fission process.
Gaps Identified for Assaying Multiple Radionuclides in One Sample
Following an RN emergency, source term assessment, environmental monitoring or other 
investigations would inform the key radionuclides released from the incident. However, 
sometimes the radionuclides information may not be immediately available. Laboratories 
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performing bioassay may need to screen the samples to identify the radionuclides involved, 
select the methods/techniques for assaying each of them, determine the sizes of sub-samples 
for different analyses, and allocate time for sample preparation and measurements. In this 
exercise, eight of the participating laboratories did not report their efforts in sample 
screening; they only reported the assays of specific radionuclides in the sample.
Only six of the 19 participating laboratories reported results for all of the four radionuclides. 
The other laboratories reported results for some or none of them. These laboratories may not 
have the methods and techniques to identify and/or quantify all of the radionuclides (α, β, 
and γ emitters); some laboratories may only be equipped with gamma spectrometers while 
some others may only be equipped with ICP-MS.
This exercise reveals that, generally, participating laboratories have the technical capacity to 
assess internal contamination to support effective public health and medical response to a 
nuclear emergency, although for some of them, their capacity is quite limited. To be useful 
in a response, in addition to being accurate, assessments must also be timely and sometimes 
need to be done with a smaller volume of sample (say, 30 to 100 mL). In the event of a 
large-scale emergency that overwhelms national bioassay capacity, delivering a timely result 
will require efficient international coordination among laboratories, including sharing 
samples and delivering results. Although efforts within GHSI, WHO, and IAEA have made 
notable progress towards establishing international laboratory networks to provide surge 
capacity and related assistance to support an emergency response, results from this exercise 
indicate that challenges remain to ensuring that results are delivered in a timely, consistent 
and reliable manner to support medical interventions.
Recommendations
The GHSI Laboratory Network for Emergency Radionuclide Bioassay has been working on 
identifying the gaps and developing capabilities and surge capacity for responding to a 
radiological or nuclear (RN) emergency. This informal laboratory network is complementary 
to the assistance capabilities established through RANET (IAEA) and REMPAN (WHO). It 
is recommended that the three networks further strengthen their collaborations and leverage 
their efforts in developing the global capabilities and capacity for emergency radionuclide 
bioassay, including: (1). Organizing a technical workshop to facilitate exchanges and 
learning among the laboratories; (2). Initiating a laboratory hands-on training program 
among laboratories; (3). Developing a practical plan for coordinating sample sharing and 
analysis, and integrating this plan into national emergency preparedness and response. These 
recommendations are those of the GHSI laboratory network and based on information 
gathered from the two exercises. These recommendations do not represent one particular 
agency.
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Figure 1. 
Distribution of the reported results for 90Sr in the urine sample (the dashed lines indicate the 
spiked level with 95% CI).
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Figure 2. 
Distribution of the reported results for 106Ru in the urine sample (the dashed lines indicate 
the spiked level with 95% CI).
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Figure 3. 
Distribution of the reported results for 137Cs in the urine sample (the dashed lines indicate 
the spiked level with 95% CI). Note that for L16, as the reported result is very different from 
the others, it is presented here as an insert.
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Figure 4. 
Distribution of the reported results for 239Pu in the urine sample (the dashed lines indicate 
the spiked level with 95% CI).
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Li et al. Page 14
Table 1
Spiked activities (Bq) of the four radionuclides in a 250 mL sample provided to each participating laboratory 
and their concentration (Bq/L) (95% CI)
Radionuclide 90Sr* 106Ru* 137Cs 239Pu
Activity in a 250 mL sample (Bq) 5.02 ± 0.03 20.1 ± 0.6 100 ± 1 0.00994 ± 0.00003
Concentration (Bq/L) 20.08 ± 0.12 80.4 ± 2.4 400 ± 4 0.03976 ± 0.00012
*90Sr/90Y and 106Ru/106Rh are in equilibrium
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Table 2
Reported bioassay results (95% CI) from the participating laboratories
Lab Code 90Sr (Bq/L) 106Ru (Bq/L) 137Cs (Bq/L) 239Pu (mBq/L)
L01 <LoD*
L02 403 ± 15 42 ± 5
L03 73.3 ± 9.9 392 ± 29 43 ± 8.2
L04 17 ± 1.3 80 ± 8 420 ± 30
L05 20 ± 2 79 ± 7 418 ± 4 47 ± 13
L06 19.6 ± 2.7 410 ± 36 38.7 ± 6.6
L07 81.6 ± 7.6 401 ± 25
L08 83.6 ± 8.4 413 ± 5.6 40.4 ± 8
L09 50 ± 25 70 ± 15 400 ± 62 46 ± 16
L10 19.8 ± 3.3 67 ± 17 351 ± 34 50 ± 36**
L12 17.9 ± 1.3 37 ± 10
L13 20 ± 2 67.6 ± 4.7 364 ± 11 57.2 ± 8.1
L14 78.4 ± 10.2 423 ± 10
L15 427 ± 47
L16 2368 ± 206
L17 7.2 ± 1.6 80 ± 24 388 ± 48 39.2 ± 18
L18 79.5 ± 9.5 413 ± 50 44 ± 15
L19 21.6 ± 13.6 68 ± 28 400 ± 40 39.6 ± 9.2
*
LoD was reported as 70 mBq/L;
**
LoD was reported as 30 mBq/L
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